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RECENT DECISIONS
Although a court could possibly order him to appoint someone, it
could not tell him whom to appoint.42 Therefore, it seems the chair-
man could continue to recommend only himself for the position.
The Appellate Division probably could have aided in the effec-
tuation of stable county government to a greater extent by sustaining
the petition, rather than by dismissing it. The Board of Supervisors
should not be permitted to ignore what is undoubtedly the clear
mandate of the law to appoint only persons recommended by the
county political chairman. "The public interest requires that such
illegal procedure be disapproved." 43
M
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CIVIL SERVICE COmMIssION-ATTEMPT
TO ADJUST REQUIRED PASSING GRADE OF EXAMINATION WITHOUT
ADVANCE NOTICE TO CANDIDATES OF SUCH CHANGE HELD INVALID.
-Petitioners brought an Article 78 proceeding to annul the deter-
mination of the New York City Civil Service Commission affecting
the grading of a promotion examination. Candidates were required
to obtain a grade of seventy per cent in both parts of the written test
to qualify for the rest of the examination. Determining that Part I
had been too difficult, the Commission without advance notice applied
a conversion formula in accordance with a civil service rule, which did
not become effective, however, until two weeks after the examination
was held. Petitioners claimed that employment of the conversion
formula resulted in a greater number passing the entire examination,
thereby placing petitioners lower on the list. Reversing the Appellate
Division, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Civil Service
Commission may not lawfully adjust the required passing grade of an
examination unless it notifies the candidates in advance of the ex-
amination by duly promulgated rule that such an adjustment may
be made. Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627,
189 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959).
Regulation through the administrative process has been effec-
tuated on both the state and federal levels since the founding of our
,country.' As a result of the steady growth of administrative law
"the state has extended its controls into every aspect of our indi-
-vidual and collective activities." 2 The reasons for the increase of
42 Gimprich v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 401, 406, 118 N.E.2d 578, 580
(1954) ; People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, 30, 43 N.E. 418,
419 (1896).
43 Ahern v. Board of Supervisors, 6 N.Y.2d 376, 383, 160 N.E.2d 640, 643,
189 N.Y.S.2d 888, 892 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
1See GELLEORN & BYsE, ADmINisTmnvE LAW 1-7 (1954).
2 Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administra-
live Process, 28 FoRDHam L. REv. 1, 3 (1959).
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administrative agencies in government functions are several and
varied.3 The amount of authority which is delegated to the indi-
vidual agency is determined by the enabling act,4 and such power
may be express or implied.5 In carrying out this authority the
administrative agency often acts both legislatively and judicially.6
Because of the concentration of power in the various agencies,
the problem of judicial review is perhaps the most important in the
area.7 Although there are several decisions which indicate that the
Constitution prohibits the barring of all judicial review,8 especially
where constitutional or jurisdictional facts are in question, certain
areas have heretofore been relatively free from judicial review. 9 In
other areas the doctrine is greatly restricted so as to be available
only when the act complained of is illegal, arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical as a matter of law.10
The power of the courts to review administrative acts lies gen-
erally in two areas, i.e., in the judicial area of trial-type hearings"
and in the legislative area of rule making.'2 Because of the wide
3 Ibid. Among the reasons set down by the author are the following:
the need for continuous, consistent, integrated regulation and control; the
tremendous volume of cases involved; the need for swift, inexpensive action;
the necessary requirement for the wise exercise of great amounts of flexibility
and discretion. Ibid.
4 GaEL.xoR & BYSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65.
5 "In absence of . . . express statutory provision the authority of the . . .
agency to adopt rules and regulations has been held to be implied by the
enabling act. . . ." KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIvm SEWcE 103 (1958). See
also Mayor v. Sands, 105 N.Y. 210, 11 N.E. 820 (1887); J)Drdan v. City of
Mobile, 260 Ala. 393, 71 So.2d 513 (1954).
0
sCompare Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627, 189
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959) (exercise of legislative power in determining grade
requirements), with In re Larson, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430 (1952)
(exercise of judicial power in conducting a hearing). These two functions
have been respectively classified as "administrative legislation" and "admin-
istrative adjudication." Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making,
52 HARv. L. REv. 259 (1938).
7 See generally, Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in
the Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1959).
8 See St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1935);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
9 These areas as set forth in Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial
Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17-26 (1959)
are: (a) military matters; (b) immigration and treatment of aliens; (c) for-
eign affairs; (d) political issues; (e) government programs; (f) negative
agency orders.
10 See KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERvicE 146 (1958).
11 See Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Han-Lee Mao v. Brownell,
207 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In some cases there is no right to a judicial
hearing. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
22 See Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627, 189 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1959). See also Dowling v. Brennan, 284 App. Div. 563, 131 N.Y.S.2d
594 (1st Dep't 1954); Gilburt v. Kroll, 144 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
aff'd, 1 App. Div.2d 819, 150 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1956) (memorandum
decision).
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amount of discretion involved in rule-making, courts are reluctant
to overturn agency decisions in this area.18 Thus, only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion or where a constitutional or statutory
mandate has been violated will the courts intervene.1 4
The civil service commissions were among the first administra-
tive agencies empowered to make rules implementing the enabling
act which had the force and effect of law. 15 The rules of this type
of agency generally were concerned with the administration and con-
tent of examinations, 6 and the problem of review has become an
increasingly more important one for the New York courts.' 7 The
conflict normally arises because of the interplay between two estab-
lished principles of administrative law, namely, the indispensable
right of agencies to alter announced judgments or standards where
unforeseeable circumstances require's and the rule that an agency
is bound by its own rules.' 9
Applying these rules to the facts of the instant case, the question
is posed whether the Civil Service Commission, if it deems such
change necessary, may validly alter one of its rules covering grade re-
quirements where no notice of such change was given to candidates.
The view of the courts with respect to the validity of the retroactive
effect of such rule changing can best be seen by an analysis of the case
law in the area.
13 See Maxwell v. Civil Service Comm., 169 Cal. 336, 146 Pac. 869 (1915).
See also Pratt v. Rosenthal, 181 Cal. 158, 183 Pac. 542 (1919).
In those cases where the courts have interfered they have not substituted
their judgment for that of the commission, "but have merely invalidated the
determinations or actions of the personnel agency as being contrary to the
law's requirements." KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERvIcE 132 (1958).
14 Compare Application of Fallon, 14 Misc2d 918, 178 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup.
Ct. 1958), with Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627, 189
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959).
15 See Rogers v. City of Buffalo, 123 N.Y. 173, 25 N.E. 274 (1890);
George v. City of Seattle, 184 Wash. 560, 52 P.2d 360 (1935). For the
distinction between administrative "rules" and "regulations" see KAPLAN,
THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 107 (1958).
1 6 See, e.g., Bridgeman v. Kern, 282 N.Y. 375, 26 N.E.2d 299 (1940);
Sloat v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367, 9 N.E.2d 12 (1937); Fink v.
Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E.2d 462 (1936); Dowling v. Brennan, 284 App.
Div. 563, 131 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st Dep't 1954).
U17New York courts in early cases declined to examine into the merits of
civil service examinations. See Levanthal, Administrative Law in New York
Civil Service Litigation, 15 FORDHAm L. REv. 62, 72 (1946). For recent cases
where courts have intervened in civil service cases, see Hymes v. Schechter,
6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627, 189 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959); Dowling v. Brennan,
284 App. Div. 563, 131 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st Dep't 1954); Gilburt v. Kroll,
144 N.Y.S2d 219, aff'd, 1 App. Div.2d 819, 150 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1956)
(memorandum decision).
18 See Levanthal, Administrative Law in New York Civil Service Litigation,
15 FORDHAm L. REv. 62, 74-75 (1946). See also Abramson v. Commissioner
of Educ., 1 App. Div.2d 366, 150 N.Y.S.2d 270 (3d Dep't 1956).
1'D See Wittekind v. Kern, 170 Misc. 939, 11 N.Y.S.2nd 569 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
affd mere., 256 App. Div. 918, 10 N.Y.S.2d 862, aff'd inem., 281 N.Y. 701,
23 N.E.2d 537 (1939).
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In Brady v. Finegan,20 a candidate for the New York City
police force was notified of his failure in the written test because of
a rating of forty per cent in the subject of memory. At the date of
the written test, the Commission rules required only a twenty per cent
minimum grade in each announced subject. Before the release of the
results, the rule was amended to require fifty per cent in each subject.
The Court of Appeals upheld the new rule as not improperly retro-
active, especially since the identity of candidates remained undisclosed
when the rule was revised. However, in a later case, Wittekind v.
Kern,21 where the Commission after promulgating a list containing
only candidates who had received the required passing mark in each
of a series of tests as well as an overall passing mark for the entire
test, attempted to re-rate the papers of candidates who had received
an overall passing mark but who had failed to receive the required
mark in one or another of the tests, the court directed the Commis-
sion to strike from the eligible list those placed thereon as a result
of the Commission's re-rating.
22
In Dowling v. Brennan,23 the Civil Service Commission had
failed to advise the candidates in advance of their taking the written
examination that failure to obtain a passing mark in the first part
of the examination would disqualify the candidate. In holding the
examination invalid the court stated:
The candidates for the examination had no advance notice that the passing
of Part I of the written examination was prerequisite to having the balance
of the written examination rated and considered in the aggregate mark....
[T]here is a sound public policy served in requiring the civil service com-
mission to provide as much information in advance concerning the procedure
affecting an examination as is consistent with sound and practical adminis-
20269 N.Y. 571, 199 N.E. 676 (1935) (memorandum decision). See also
Allen v. Finegan, 254 App. Div. 858, 6 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1st Dep't 1938)
(memorandum decision). The Appellate Division in the instant case relied,
inter alia, on the Brady case in upholding the act of the Commission. Hymes
v. Schechter, 7 App. Div.2d 294, 182 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1st Dep't 1959).
21 170 Misc. 939, 11 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd irem., 256 App.
Div. 918, 10 N.Y.S.2d 862, aff'd inem., 281 N.Y. 701, 23 N.E.2d 537 (1939).
22 The court there stated:
"There was nothing improper in the original rule fixing the requirement
of an eighty per cent general average in order to have an applicant placed on
the promotion list. That was notice not only to those who took the exam-
ination, but to the world at large that this examination was to be determined
-on the basis of an eighty per cent average. That is the law of this case,
and is binding on the commission as well as every one else." Id. at 941,
11 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
See also Poss v. Kern, 263 App. Div. 320, 32 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1st Dep't
1942), where the court declined to permit adding to an eligible list additional
candidates who barely failed to receive a passing mark, although the Com-
mission sought to increase the number of eligible candidates in order to meet
the needs of the service and to avoid the expense of a further examination.
23284 App. Div. 563, 131 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st Dep't 1954).
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tration. . . Accordingly, the failure to give advance notice in this instance
was a material defect in procedure which . . . requires . . . relief.24
Similarly, in Gilburt v. Kroll,25 where candidates for licenses
as principals of elementary day schools were not given advance
notice that the passing mark for the practical examination might be
changed from sixty to sixty-five per cent after the examination was
completed, it was held that such subsequent change of the passing
mark, thereby depriving candidates who had attained a mark of
sixty per cent from advancing further, was illegal.26
However, two other cases seem somewhat contrary to the de-
cision in the Gilburt case. In Abramson v. Commissioner of Educ.,27
an examination was given in separate parts. Between the dates of
the holding of the two sections of the written examination, the Board
of Examiners promulgated a passing mark of sixty-five per cent.
After the papers were graded, but before the candidates were iden-
tified, the Board concluded that the examination was too difficult
and accordingly voted to give a five per cent credit to each of the
candidates. Reversing the Commissioner of Education who had
directed the Board of Examiners to rescind the credit as a violation
of the constitutional mandate of competitiveness,2 8 the court stated:
No constitutional principle was violated by the Board in this case by its action
in lowering the "hurdle," after the written examination had been given, and in
accordingly allowing candidates whom it believed to be fit and qualified, to
go on to the other phases of the examination.29
In Robbins v. Schechter,30 an examination announcement in
January 1946 was made for the position of captain in the police
department. At that time it was stated that a minimum passing
mark might be required and would be so stated in the official ques-
tion booklet. In April 1956 rule V of the Rules of the Civil Service
24 Id. at 565-66, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
25 2 N.Y.2d 896, 141 N.E.2d 631, 161 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1957) (memorandum
decision).26 Whereas in the instant case the action of the Commission resulted in a
greater number passing the entire examination, in the Gilburt case the Com-
mission's action resulted in a smaller number passing the entire examination.
27 1 App. Div.2d 366, 150 N.Y.S.2d 270 (3d Dep't 1956).28 Art. 5, § 6 of the New York State Constitution provides:
"Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and of all
the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according
to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination
which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. .. ."29 Abramson v. Commissioner of Educ., 1 App. Div.2d 366, 374, 150 N.Y.S.2d
270, 279 (3d Dep't 1956). Interestingly, the court in Abransmz. says that the
Commissioner could have annulled the five per cent credit in his discretion as
a matter of educational policy but not on the grounds that it violated the
constitutional principle of competitiveness. Ibid.
307 Misc.Zd 436, 162 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nen., 3 App. Div.2d
1010, 165 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd nmer., 4 N.Y.2d 935, 151 N.E.2d
613, 175 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1958).
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Commission was amended so as to provide for the use of a mathe-
matical formula which would take into account test difficulty and
other relevant test factors on the rating of the examination. The
examination was administered in June 1956, and the test booklet
stated that candidates were required to obtain a seventy per cent
grade in each of the two parts to pass the entire examination. Sub-
sequent to the taking of the examination but before the candidates
were identified it was determined that not a sufficient number would
pass to complete the list, and the mathematical formula was employed
with a resulting greater number of candidates passing the examina-
tion. In upholding the use of the formula the court maintained that
the fact that the instruction booklet contained a notice that the pass-
ing mark was seventy per cent was not binding in the face of the
civil service rule stating that a change in grading might be made.
Such was the development of case law in the area prior to the
decision in the instant case, a development that followed no formal
pattern. Thus, while the courts in general were reluctant to exercise
the power of judicial review,"' their infrequent efforts produced no
uniformity. The Court of Appeals in the instant case has clarified
the situation somewhat.8 2 In holding that a civil service body may
not lawfully adjust the required passing grade for part of an exam-
ination, unless it notifies the candidates in advance that such an
adjustment may be made, the Court here conforms with and
strengthens the Wittekind,83 Dowling,3 4 and Gilburt 35 decisions. By
distinguishing Robbins v. Schechter,36 the Court demonstrates that
where a rule is in existence at the time of the taking of the exam-
ination which notifies candidates that the grading method is subject
to change even after completion of the examination, then notwith-
standing a stated passing grade in the test booklet, such grade re-
quirements may validly be changed. However, where, as in the
instant case, the rule giving notice of such possible change has not
yet been fully approved, 7 it does not operate as constructive notice
31 "Generally the courts have been circumspect in reviewing ratings of
examination papers, and have confined their review solely to cases where
there has been a clear showing that the competitive principle has been violated,
or that the ratings are so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be indefensible."
KAPLAN, THE LAw OF CIVIL SERVIcE 158-59 (1958).
S2 See Hymes v. Schechter, 6 N.Y.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 627, 189 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1959).
33 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
34 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
35 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
36 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
37 Often the rules of the state personnel agency are not effective until
approved by the governor, see McCann v. Personnel Bd. of Wis., 255 Wis.
321, 38 N.W.2d 480 (1949), the state commission, see Burri v. Kern, 180
Misc. 74, 39 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1943), or the mayor, see Hymes v.
Schechter, supra note 32.
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of possible change and the Commission is bound by the original re-
quirements it has promulgated.
The Abranon decision. 38 has not, however, been clarified by
Hymes and remains inconsistent with the decision in that case.
Although the Appellate Division cited Abramson as its authority in
upholding the act of the Commission,3 9 the Court of Appeals in re-
versing the Appellate Division failed even to mention the case. In
light of the Hymes decision the Abramson case might well be re-
stricted to its facts in the future.
The decision of the Court in the Hymes case does not violate
the accepted rule of administrative law that courts will not generally
review discretionary acts of the agency. The reasoning of the Court
of Appeals indicates, and rightly so, that this is not a case of dis-
cretion but rather of agency noncompliance with one of its own
rules. While much can be said for the refusal of the judiciary to
question the wisdom of discretionary acts of the agency, courts should
not be reluctant to review those decisions where what is involved is
not an exercise of discretion but rather the application of its own
rules and regulations. Judicial review is imperative in such cases to
guarantee the continuance of individual rights.
M
ARBITRATION - EQUITY - BOAm'S ORDER OF EMPLOYEE'S
REINSTATEMENT AGAINsT EmPLOYER'S WISHES HELD VALIm.-
Appellant, a foreign corporation, entered into an eleven-year contract
employing respondent in a highly responsible position. The contract
provided that if respondent should be permanently disabled, he would
receive reduced compensation for three years. It was further pro-
vided that any controversy arising out of the contract should be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the American Arbitration
Association Rules, which authorize specific performance of a contract.
The board of directors determined that respondent was permanently
disabled and that his services should be terminated. He disputed
this finding and the controversy was submitted for arbitration. The
Court of Appeals held that the arbitrators' award ordering petitioner's
reinstatement was final and would be confirmed. Matter of Staklinski
(Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959).
"Arbitration is intended to effect a summary and extrajudicial
38 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
39 See Hymes v. Schechter, 7 App. Div.2d 294, 296, 182 N.Y.S2d 726, 728,(1st Dep't 1959).
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